SEC 7: ABSTRACT IDEAS
- A very material question has been asked whether abstract or general ideas are conceived by the mind in a general or particular way.
- Dr. Berkeley, a great philosopher, has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which:
- gives them a more extensive signification
- makes them recall other individuals similar to them.
- I see this as one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries recently made in the republic of letters.
- I shall confirm it by some arguments to put it beyond all doubt and controversy.
- In forming most of our general ideas:
- we abstract from it every particular degree of quantity and quality
- an object continues to be regarded as part of its species despite small alterations in its extension, duration and other properties.
- This is a dilemma that answers the nature of those abstract ideas.
- The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities.
- This can only be done by representing:
- All possible sizes and all possible qualities at once, or
- This is absurd as it would imply an infinite capacity in the mind.
- No particular one at all.
- This is the common representation for our abstract ideas, representing no particular degree of quantity or quality.
- But this is wrong.
- I shall show this error:
- by proving that it is utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of its degrees, and
- by showing that even if the mind’s capacity is not infinite, we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality that may serve all the purposes of reflection and conversation, however imperfect.
- All possible sizes and all possible qualities at once, or
- This can only be done by representing:
- This first proposition is: the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of degrees of each.
- We may prove this by three arguments:
- Objects that are different are distinguishable.
- Objects that are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination.
- These propositions are equally true in the inverse.
- Objects that are separable are also distinguishable.
- Objects that are distinguishable are also different.
- For how can we:
- separate what is not distinguishable, or
- distinguish what is not different?
- To know whether abstraction implies a separation, we only need to:
- consider it in this view, and
- examine whether all the circumstances which we abstract from in our general ideas, is distinguishable and different from the ideas which we retain as their essential parts.
- But at first sight:
- a line’s precise length is not different nor distinguishable from the line itself, and
- the precise degree of any quality is not different nor distinguishable from the quality.
- Therefore, these ideas admit no more of separation than they do of distinction and difference.
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- Consequently, they are conjoined with each other in the conception.
- The general idea of a line appears in the mind with a precise degree of quantity and quality, despite all our abstractions and refinements.
- However, it may be made to represent others which have different degrees of quantity and quality.
- It is contested that no object can appear to the senses.
- In other words, no impression can become present to the mind without being determined in its degrees of quantity and quality.
- The confusion, in which impressions are sometimes involved, proceeds only from their faintness and unsteadiness.
- It does not come from any capacity in the mind to receive any impression.
- In its real existence, any impression has no particular degree nor proportion.
- It does not come from any capacity in the mind to receive any impression.
- That is a contradiction in terms.
- It implies that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be.
- Since all ideas are derived from impressions and are nothing but copies and representations of them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the other.
- Impressions and ideas differ only in their strength and vivacity.
- This conclusion is not founded on any particular degree of vivacity.
- Therefore, it cannot be affected by any variation in that particular.
- An idea is a weaker impression.
- As a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy or representative.
- A general principle in philosophy is that:
- everything in nature is individual
- it is absurd to suppose that a triangle can have no precise proportion of sides and angles.
- If this is absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea.
- Since no clear and distinct idea which we can form is absurd and impossible.
- But forming the idea of an object and forming an idea is simply the same thing.
- The reference of the idea to an object is an extraneous denomination.
- It bears no mark or character in itself.
- The reference of the idea to an object is an extraneous denomination.
- It is impossible to form an idea of an object that has quantity and quality but has no precise degree of either.
- It follows that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea that is unlimited in quantity and quality.
- Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation.
- The image in the mind is only that of a particular object.
- Though the application of it in our reasoning is the same, as if it were universal.
- This application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner for the purposes of life.
- This is my second proposition.
- When we find a resemblance [Footnote 2] among several objects that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever:
- differences we may observe in their quantity and quality
- other differences may appear among them
- After we have acquired this custom, the hearing of that name:
- revives the idea of one of these objects, and
- makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances and proportions.
- But the same word is also frequently applied to other individuals that are different from that idea immediately present to the mind.
- The word is unable to revive the idea of all these individuals, but only touches the soul and revives that acquired custom.
- They are not really and in fact present to the mind, but only in power.
- We do not draw them all out distinctly in the imagination.
- Instead, we keep ourselves ready to survey any of them, depending on our present design or necessity.
- The word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom.
- That custom produces any other individual one, for which we may have occasion.
- But the production of all the ideas, to which the name may be applied, is in most eases impossible.
- We abridge that work by a more partial consideration.
- We find but few inconveniences arising in our reasoning from that abridgment.
Footnote 2.
- Even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other.
- It is unnecessary that the point or circumstance of resemblance should be distinct or separable from that in which they differ.
- Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet.
- Though their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction.
- It is the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells.
- These admit of infinite resemblances on the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same.
- This is certain even from the very abstract term ‘simple idea’.
- They comprehend all simple ideas under them.
- These resemble each other in their simplicity.
- Yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest.
- It is the same case with all the degrees in any quality.
- They are all resembling, yet the quality in any individual, is not distinct from the degree.
- This is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the present affair, that after the mind has produced an individual idea on which we reason, the attendant custom:
- is revived by the general or abstract term
- readily suggests any other individual, if by chance we form any reasoning that does not agree with it.
- If we mention ‘triangle’ and form the idea of an equilateral triangle to correspond to it, and assert that its three angles are equal to each other, the other angles of a scalenum and isosceles triangles, which we overlooked at first, immediately:
- crowd in on us
- make us perceive the falsehood of this proposition
- Even if it were true with relation to the equilateral triangle.
- If the mind does not always suggest these ideas, it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties.
- This imperfection is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry.
- This is principally the case with abstruse and compounded ideas.
- On other occasions:
- the custom is more entire
- we seldom run into such errors.
- The custom is not so entire.
- The very same idea may be:
- annexed to several different words
- employed in different reasonings without any danger of mistake.
- The very same idea may be:
- Thus, the idea of an equilateral triangle with a perpendicular inch serves us in talking of:
- a figure
- a rectilinear figure
- a regular figure
- a triangle, and
- an equilateral triangle.
- In this case, all these terms are attended with the same idea.
- But as these terms are applied to an awareness of ideas, they:
- excite their particular habits
- keep the mind ready to observe that no conclusion is formed contrary to any ideas under them.
- But as these terms are applied to an awareness of ideas, they:
- Before those habits have become perfect, the mind might not be content with forming the idea of only one individual.
- It may run over several to make itself comprehend:
- its own meaning.
- our awareness of that collection, which it intends to express by the general term.
- It may run over several to make itself comprehend:
- To define the word ‘figure’, we may:
- revolve in our mind the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms, triangles of different sizes and proportions
- not rest on one image or idea.
- We form the idea of individuals whenever we use any general term.
- We seldom or never can exhaust these individuals.
- Those which remain are only represented by means of that habit, by which we recall them, whenever any present occasion requires it.
- This then is the nature of our abstract ideas and general terms.
- In this way, we account for the foregoing paradox, that some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation.
- A particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term.
- This general term:
- has a relation to many other particular ideas, from a customary conjunction
- readily recalls those ideas in the imagination.
- This general term:
- The only difficulty is the that custom which so readily:
- recalls every particular idea we may have occasion for
- is excited by any word or sound we commonly annex to it.
- I think the most proper method of giving a satisfactory explanation of this act of the mind is by producing:
- other instances analogous to it, and
- other principles which facilitate its operation.
- To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossible.
- It is sufficient to give any satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy.
- When we mention any big number, such as 1,000, the mind generally has no adequate idea of it.
- It can only produce such an idea through its idea of decimals, under which the number is comprehended.
- However, this imperfection in our ideas is never felt in our reasonings.
- It seems to be an instance parallel to the present reasoning of universal ideas.
- We have several instances of habits, which may be revived by a single word.
- A person who has memorized a discourse can remember it through that single word.
- We do not annex distinct and complete ideas to every term we use.
- In talking of government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas which make up these complex ideas.
- Despite this imperfection, we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects.
- We may perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a fall comprehension of them.
- Thus, instead of saying the weaker in war have always recourse to negotiation, we should say that they have always recourse to conquest.
- Our custom of attributing certain relations to ideas:
- still follows the words, and
- makes us immediately perceive that proposition’s absurdity in the same way as one idea may serve us in reasoning on other ideas, however different in several circumstances.
- Our custom of attributing certain relations to ideas:
- The individuals are collected together and placed under a general term which resembles each other.
- This relation must:
- facilitate their entrance in the imagination, and
- make them be suggested more readily.
- This relation must:
- If we consider the thought’s common progress in reflection or conversation, we shall find great reason to be satisfied in this.
- The imagination’s readiness is most admirable.
- This readiness:
- suggests its ideas, and
- presents those ideas the moment they become necessary or useful.
- This readiness:
- The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas belonging to any subject.
- One would think that:
- the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and
- we did nothing but pick out ideas which were most proper for our purpose.
- One would think that:
- However, only the ideas collected by a kind of magical faculty in the soul may be present.
- This faculty is always most perfect in the greatest geniuses.
- It is what we call a genius.
- It is inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding.
- These four reflections may help remove difficulties to the hypothesis I have proposed on abstract ideas.
- This is so contrary to the prevailing hypothesis in philosophy.
- To tell the truth, I place my chief confidence in my proposition on the impossibility of general ideas, according to the common method of explaining them.
- We must certainly seek some new system on this head.
- There is none beside what I have proposed.
- If ideas are particular in their nature and finite in their number at the same time, only by custom can they:
- become general in their representation, and
- contain an infinite number of other ideas under them.
- I shall use the same principles to explain that distinction of reason which is:
- so much talked of,
- so little understood in the schools.
- Of this kind is the distinction between:
- figure and the body figured, and
- motion and the body moved.
- The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the above principle, that all different ideas are separable.
- It follows that if the figure is different from the body, their ideas must be separable and distinguishable.
- If they are not different, their ideas cannot be separable nor distinguishable.
- What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation.
- To remove this difficulty, we must have recourse to the foregoing explanation of abstract ideas.
- The mind would never distinguish a figure from the body figured, as being indistinguishable, different, nor separable, if it did not observe that there might be many different resemblances and relations, even in this simplicity.
- When a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour disposed in a certain form.
- We are unable to separate and distinguish the colour from the form.
- But if we observe a black marble globe and a white marble cube afterwards and compare them with the white marble globe, we find two separate resemblances in what before seemed, and really is, perfectly inseparable.
- After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason.
- We consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable.
- But we still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances they are susceptible of.
- When a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour disposed in a certain form.
- When we would consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in reality an idea of the figure and colour.
- But we tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the black marble globe.
- In the same way, when we consider its colour only, we turn our view to its resemblance with the white marble cube.
- Through this, we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflection which custom renders us insensible of.
- A person who wants us to consider a white marble globe without thinking of its colour, wants an impossibility.
- His meaning is that we should consider the shape and colour together, but still keep the resemblance to:
- the black marble globe, or
- any other globe of whatever colour or substance.
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