Sec 10: Property, Riches

SEC. 10: PROPERTY AND RICHES

• The relation of property:
  • is esteemed the closest
  • most commonly produces pride.
• Justice and other moral virtues must be explained first before this relation can be fully explained.
• Property is a relation between a person and an object which permits him its free use and possession, but does not forbid any other, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity.
  • Therefore, if justice is a virtue which has a natural and original influence on the mind, property may be regarded as a particular species of causation, whether we:
    • consider the liberty it gives the proprietor to operate as he pleases on the object, or
    • the advantages he reaps from it.
  • It is the same case if justice is an artificial and not a natural virtue.
    • For then honour, custom, and civil laws:
      • supply the place of natural conscience
      • produce the same effects.
• The mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor, and of the proprietor to the property.
  • This is a proof of a perfect relation of ideas.
• A relation of ideas, joined to that of impressions, always produces a transition of affections.
  • If the foregoing system is solid and satisfactory, whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an object connected with us by property, pride or humility must arise from this conjunction of relations.
  • This can be proven by the most cursory view of human life.

• Everything belonging to a vain man is the best that is to be found anywhere.
  • His houses, equipage, furniture, clothes, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit.
  • He draws a new subject of pride and vanity from the smallest advantage in any of these.
• If you’ll believe him:
  • his wine has a finer flavour than any other
  • his cookery is more exquisite
  • his table is more orderly
  • his servants are more expert
  • the air he lives in is more healthful
  • the soil he cultivates is more fertile
  • his fruits ripen earlier and more perfectly.
• Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty; such another for its antiquity.
  • This is the workmanship of a famous artist that belonged once to a prince or great man.
• All objects that are useful, beautiful or surprising, or are related to such, may cause vanity through property.
  • These agree in giving pleasure and in nothing else.
  • This alone is common to them.
  • Therefore, it must be the quality that produces vanity, which is their common effect.
• Every new instance is a new argument.
  • The instances are here innumerable.
  • No other system has ever been so fully proved by experience as my system.

Hume on Money and Riches

• If the property of anything that gives pleasure also produces also pride by a double relation of impressions and ideas, we should not be surprised that the power of acquiring this property should have the same effect.
  • Riches are the power of acquiring the property of what pleases.
    • They influence the passions only because of this.
• Paper will be considered as riches because it may convey the power of acquiring money.
  • Money is not riches.
    • It is a metal endowed with qualities of solidity, weight and fusibility.
    • It is only riches as long as it has a relation to the life’s pleasures and conveniences.
• We may draw from this, one of my strongest arguments to prove the influence of the double relations on pride and humility.

• The distinction we sometimes make between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous.
  • Man or any other being should never be thought having any ability, unless it is exerted and put in action.
  • This is strictly true in a just and philosophical way of thinking.
• But this is not the philosophy of our passions.
  • Many things operate on our passions through the idea and supposition of power, independent of its actual exercise.
• We are pleased when we get an ability to procure pleasure.
  • We are displeased when another gets a power of giving pain.
• To explain this and to account for this satisfaction and uneasiness, we must weigh the following reflections.

• The error of distinguishing power from its exercise proceeds not entirely from the scholastic doctrine of free-will.
  • This enters very little into common life.
  • It has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking.
• According to that doctrine, motives do not:
  • deprive us of free-will
  • take away our power of performing or refraining from any action.
• A man has no power if he has very considerable motives between him and the satisfaction of his desires but is unable to do it.
  • I do not think I have fallen into my enemy’s power, when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side while I do not have any weapon.
  • I know that:
    • the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron
    • I am in as perfect safety as if he were chained or imprisoned.
• But I attribute a full power to him and consider myself as his subject if he gets such an authority over me, that:
  • there is no external obstacle to his actions
  • he may punish or reward me as he pleases, without any dread of punishment in his turn.

• One person has very strong motives of interest or safety to refrain from any action.
  • Another person lies under no such obligation.
• If we compare these two persons, we shall find that the only known difference between them is that the first person will never perform that action, but the second person will probably perform it.
• Nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant than man’s will.
• Only strong motives can give us an absolute certainty in his future actions.
  • When we see a person free from these motives, we suppose a possibility or probability of his acting or forbearing.
• We may conclude him to be determined by motives and causes.
  • Yet this does not remove:
    • the uncertainty of our judgment on these causes, or
    • the influence of that uncertainty on the passions.
• Since we ascribe a power of performing an action to everyone who has no very powerful motive to refrain from it, and refuse it to people who have such a motive, we may conclude that:
  • power has always a reference to its actual or probable exercise
  • we consider a person as endowed with any ability when we find from past experience, that it is probable, or at least possible he may exert it.
• Our passions always regard the real existence of objects.
  • We always judge of this reality from past instances.
  • That power consists in the possibility or probability of any action, as discovered by experience.

• Wherever a person is in such a situation with regard to me, that there is no very powerful motive to deter him from injuring me.
  • Consequently, it is uncertain whether he will injure me or not.
• I must be:
  • uneasy in such a situation
  • sensibly concerned in the possibility or probability of that injury.
• The passions are affected by:
  • such events that are certain and infallible
  • events that are possible and contingent, though in an inferior degree.
• I never really feel any harm from the person who never had any power of harming me, since he did not exert any.
  • But this does not prevent my uneasiness from the preceding uncertainty.
• The agreeable passions may here:
  • operate as well as the uneasy passions.
  • convey a pleasure when I perceive a possible or probable good from the possibility or probability of another giving it to me, after the removal of any strong motives which might have formerly hindered him.

• This satisfaction increases when:
  • any good approaches in such a way that it is in one’s own power to take or leave it
  • there is no:
    • physical impediment or
    • any very strong motive to hinder our enjoyment.
• All men desire pleasure.
  • It will exist when there is no external obstacle to produce it.
• Men perceive no danger in following their inclinations.
  • In that case their imagination easily:
    • anticipates the satisfaction
    • conveys the same joy, as if they were persuaded of its real and actual existence.

• But this does not sufficiently explain the satisfaction from riches.
• A miser receives delight from his money or the power it affords him of procuring all of life’s pleasures and conveniences, even if he has never used his riches for 40 years.
  • Consequently, he cannot reason that the real existence of these pleasures is closer than if he had no money at all.
  • But he still imagines these pleasures to approach nearer, whenever all external obstacles are removed along with the more powerful motives of interest and danger which oppose it.
• For this, I must refer to my account of the will.
  • In Part 3, Sec. 2, I shall explain that false sensation of liberty, which makes us imagine we can do anything that is not very dangerous or destructive.
• Whenever any other person is under no strong obligations of interest to refrain from any pleasure, we judge that:
  • the pleasure will exist
  • he will probably obtain it.
• But when ourselves are in that situation, we judge from an illusion of the fancy, that the pleasure is still closer and more immediate.
  • The will seems to:
    • move easily every way
    • cast a shadow or image of itself, even to that side on which it did not settle.
• Through this image, the enjoyment seems to:
  • approach nearer to us
  • give us the same lively satisfaction as if it were perfectly certain and unavoidable.

• I will now prove that riches produce any pride or vanity in their possessors only through a double relation of impressions and ideas.
• The very essence of riches consists in the power of procuring life’s pleasures and conveniences.
  • The very essence of this is in:
    • the probability of its exercise
    • its causing us to anticipate, by a true or false reasoning, the real existence of the pleasure.
• This anticipation of pleasure is, in itself, a very considerable pleasure.
  • Its cause is some possession or property which:
    • we enjoy
    • is thereby related to us, we here dearly see all the parts of the foregoing system most exactly and distinctly drawn out before us.
• The same reason explains why:
  • riches and power cause pleasure and pride
  • poverty and slavery excites uneasiness and humility.
• Power or an authority over others makes us capable of satisfying all our desires
  • Slavery subjects us to the will of others and exposes us to a thousand wants and mortifications.

• The vanity of power or shame of slavery, are much augmented by the consideration of the persons:
  • over whom we exercise our authority, or
  • who exercise authority over us.
• Supposing it were possible to build moving statues that could move and act according to the will.
  • Owning them would give us pleasure and pride.
  • But not to such a degree as when we have the same authority over sensible and rational creatures.
    • Their condition, compared to our own, makes the authority seem more agreeable and honourable.
• In every case, comparison is a sure method of augmenting our esteem of anything.
  • A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing it to that of a beggar.
• But there is a peculiar advantage in power, by the contrast, which is, in a manner, presented to us, between ourselves and the person we command.
  • The comparison is obvious and natural:
  • The imagination finds it in the very subject.
  • The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy.
  • Our examination of the nature of malice and envy later will reveal that this circumstance has a considerable effect in augmenting its influence.

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SEC. 11: ThE LOVE OF FAME

• The secondary causes of pride and humility in the opinions of others has an equal influence on the affections.
• Our reputation, character, and name are considerations of vast weight and importance.
  • Even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches have little influence when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others.
• To account for this phenomenon, we need to take some compass and first explain the nature of sympathy.

The Importance of Sympathy

• The most remarkable quality of human nature, in itself and its consequences, is our propensity to:
  • sympathize with others
  • receive their inclinations and sentiments by communication, however different or even contrary to our own.
• This is conspicuous in:
  • children
    • They implicitly embrace every opinion proposed to them.
  • in men of the greatest judgment and understanding
    • They find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposing those of their friends and daily companions.
• To this principle we should ascribe the great uniformity in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation.
  • This resemblance arises more from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate which continues the same.
    • However, soil and climate cannot keep a nation’s character the same for a century.
• A good-natured man finds himself instantly of the same humour with his company.
  • Even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance.
• A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind.
  • An angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden dump on me.
• I feel the following more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition:
  • Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy.
• This remarkable phenomenon:
  • merits our attention
  • must be traced up to its first principles.

• When any affection is infused by sympathy, it is at first known only by:
  • its effects
  • those external signs in the countenance and conversation which convey its idea.
• This idea:
  • is presently converted into an impression
  • acquires a force and vivacity to:
    • become the very passion itself
    • produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.
• No matter how instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views.
  • These views will not escape a philosopher’s strict scrutiny though they may escape the scrutiny of the person who makes them.

• The idea or impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us
  • Our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person.
  • It is impossible to imagine that anything can go beyond it.
• Therefore, whatever object is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a little vivacity of conception according to the foregoing principles.
  • Though this relation is not as strong as the relation of causation, it must still have a considerable influence.
• Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected, especially when we are informed of the real existence of the resembling or contiguous object by:
  • an inference from cause and effect
  • the observation of external signs.

• Nature has preserved a great resemblance among all humans.
  • We never remark any passion or principle in others, of which we may not find a parallel in ourselves.
• The case is the same with the fabric of the mind and the body.
  • However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are generally the same.
• There is a very remarkable resemblance which preserves itself amidst all their variety.
  • This resemblance must very much contribute to make us:
    • enter into the sentiments of others
    • embrace them with facility and pleasure.
• Besides the general resemblance of our natures, we find that where there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, character, country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy.
  • The stronger the relation is between ourselves and any object, the more easily the imagination:
    • makes the transition
    • conveys to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person.

• Resemblance is not the only relation which has this effect.
  • It receives new force from other relations that may accompany it.
• The sentiments of others have little influence when:
  • far removed from us
  • the relation of contiguity is required to make them communicate themselves entirely.
• The relations of blood is a species of causation.
  • It may sometimes contribute to the same effect; as also acquaintance, which operates in the same way with education and custom; as we shall see more fully afterwards (Part 2, Sec. 4).
• When all these relations are united together, they:
  • convey our own consciousness to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others
  • make us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner.

• In the beginning of this treatise, I have remarked that:
  • all ideas are borrowed from impressions
  • these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity which they strike the soul.
• The component part of ideas and impressions are precisely alike.
  • The manner and order of their appearance may be the same.
• Therefore, the different degrees of their force and vivacity are the only particulars that distinguish them.
• This difference may be removed by a relation between the impressions and ideas.
  • It is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion.
• The lively idea of any object always approaches is impression.
  • We may:
    • feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination
    • make a malady real by often thinking of it.
• This is most remarkable in the opinions and affections.
  • A lively idea is converted into an impression principally in the opinions and affections.
• Our affections depend more on ourselves and the mind’s internal operations, than on any other impressions.
  • This is why they arise more naturally from:
    • the imagination
    • every lively idea we form of them.
  • This is the nature and cause of sympathy.
    • This is how we enter so deeply into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them.

• What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phenomena give to the foregoing system on the understanding
• Consequently, to the present one concerning the passions; since these are analogous to each other.
• When we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements:
  • appear at first in our mind as mere ideas.
  • are conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact.
• The ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent.
  • The passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them.
• All this:
  • is an object of the plainest experience.
  • does not depend on any hypothesis of philosophy.
• Science can only be admitted to explain the phenomena
  • They are so clear of themselves that there is little occasion to employ it.
• The relation of cause and effect convinces of the reality of the passion we sympathize with.
  • Besides this, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection.
• These relations can:
  • entirely convert an idea into an impression
  • convey the vivacity of the latter into the former perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition.
• We may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea.
  • In sympathy, there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression.
  • This conversion arises from the relation of objects to our self.
  • Our self is always intimately present to us.
• If we compare all these circumstances, we shall find that sympathy:
  • is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding.
  • even contains something more surprising and extraordinary.

• We will now view sympathy’s influence on pride and humility, when they arise from:
  • praise and blame
  • reputation and infamy.
• No person is ever praised by another for any quality which would not produce a pride in the person who has it.
  • The praises turn on a person’s power, riches, family, or virtue.
    • All of these are subjects of vanity.
• If a person considered himself in the same light he appears to his admirer, he would:
  • first receive a separate pleasure
  • afterwards receive a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above explained.
• Nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this, from:
  • sympathy
    • It renders all their sentiments intimately present to us.
  • reasoning
    • It makes us regard their judgment as a kind of argument for what they affirm.
• These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our opinions.
  • They must have a peculiar influence when we judge of our own worth and character.
  • Such judgments are always attended with passion (Book 1, Part 3, Sec. 10).
• Nothing tends more to disturb our understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however unreasonable, than their connection with passion which:
  • diffuses itself over the imagination
  • gives an additional force to every related idea.
• Being conscious of great partiality in our own favour, we are:
  • peculiarly pleased with anything that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves
  • easily shocked with whatever opposes it.

• All this appears very probable in theory.
• But to bestow a full certainty on this reasoning, we must examine the phenomena of the passions and see if they agree with it.

• Among these phenomena, is that where we receive more satisfaction from the approbation of people we esteem, than of those we hate and despise.
  • Similarly, we are:
    • principally mortified with the contempt of persons, whose judgment we value.
    • slightly indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind.
• But if the mind received, from any original instinct, a desire of fame and aversion to infamy:
  • fame and infamy would influence us without distinction.
  • every opinion would equally excite that desire or aversion.
    • A fool’s judgment would be another person’s judgment and that of a wise man.
    • These would be only inferior in its influence on our own judgment.

• We are better pleased with the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool.
• We receive an additional satisfaction from the former, when it is obtained after a long and intimate acquaintance.

• The praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they:
  • concur with our own opinion
  • extol us for those qualities we chiefly excel in.
• A mere soldier values little eloquence.
  • A civilian, courage
  • A bishop, humour, or
  • A merchant, learning.
• The world’s opinions on a quality, which one person does not have, will give that person little pleasure because they never will be able to draw his own opinion after them.

• Men of good families but narrow circumstances usually leave their friends and country.
  • They rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers, than among those who are acquainted with their birth and education.
• They say, we shall be unknown where we go.
  • Nobody will suspect from what family we are sprung.
  • We shall be removed from all our friends and acquaintance.
  • Our poverty and meanness will sit easier on us.
• I find that these sentiments afford very convincing arguments for my present purpose.

1. The uneasiness of being contemned depends on sympathy.
   • That sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves, since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons related to us by blood and contiguous in place.
   • Hence we seek to reduce this sympathy and uneasiness by:
     • separating these relations
     • placing ourselves:
       • in a contiguity to strangers
       • at a distance from relations.

2. Relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely considered as relations, but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments, through the association between:
   • the idea of their persons
   • the idea of our own
     • For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist; but not being united in the same persons, they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy.

3. The reduction of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention.
   • Suppose I am placed in a poor condition among strangers and consequently am lightly treated.
   • I find myself easier in that situation than when I was everyday exposed to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen.
     • Here I feel a double contempt from my relations.
     • But they are absent; from those about me, but they are strangers.
     • This double contempt is likewise strengthened by the two relations of kindred and contiguity.
   • But the persons, who are connected with me by those two relations, are not the same.
     • This difference of ideas:
       • separates the impressions arising from the contempt
       • keeps them from running into each other.
   • My neighbours’ contempt has a certain influence, as has also that of my kindred.
     • But these influences are:
       • distinct
       • never unite as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are both my neighbours and kindred.
   • This phenomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above-explained.
     • This system may seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions.

4. A person in these circumstances naturally:
   • conceals his birth from those with whom he lives
   • is very uneasy if any one suspects him to be of a family much superior to his present fortune and way of living.
     • Everything in this world is judged of by comparison.
     • An immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince.
     • A peasant would think himself happy in what cannot afford necessaries for a gentleman.
     • When a man has been used to a more splendid way of living, or thinks himself entitled to it by his birth and quality, everything below is disagreeable and even shameful
       • He very much conceals his pretensions to a better fortune.
       • He himself knows his misfortunes.
       • But as those, with whom he lives. are ignorant of them, he:
         • has the disagreeable reflection and comparison suggested only by his own thoughts
         • never receives it by a sympathy with others; which must contribute very much so his ease and satisfaction.

• This hypothesis is that the pleasure we receive from praise arises from a communication of sentiments.
  • Any objections to this will confirm this hypothesis.
• Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man who despises the vulgar, because their multitude gives them additional weight and authority.
• Plagiaries are delighted with praises which they know they do not deserve.
  • This is a kind of castle-building where the imagination:
    • amuses itself with its own fictions
    • strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others.
• Proud men are most shocked with contempt because of the opposition between pride and the passion received by sympathy.
• Similarly, a violent lover is very much displeased when you blame and condemn his love.
  • Even if your opposition can only influence by:
    • its hold of himself
    • his sympathy with you.
• Whatever you say has no effect on him if he despises you or perceives you are joking.

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SEC. 12: THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS

• The causes of pride and humility correspond exactly to our hypothesis
  • Nothing can excite pride or humility unless it:
    • is related to ourselves
    • produces a pleasure or pain independent of the passion.
• We have proved that:
  • a tendency to produce pleasure or pain is common to all the causes of pride or humility
    • This tendency is the only thing which is common to them.
    • Consequently, it is the quality by which they operate.
  • the most considerable causes of pride and humility are really the power of producing agreeable or uneasy sensations.
• Therefore, all the effects of pride and humility are derived solely from that origin.
  • Such simple and natural principles are founded on such solid proofs.
  • They must be received by philosophers, unless there are objections that have escaped me.

• Anatomists usually join their observations and experiments on human bodies to those on animals.
  • From the agreement of these experiments, they derive an additional argument for any particular hypothesis.
• Where the structure and operation of parts in brutes is the same as in men the causes of that operation cannot be different.
  • Whatever we discover to be true of the one species, may be true of the other.
• The mixture of humours and composition of minute parts may justly be presumed different in men from what it is in mere animals.
  • Any experiment we make on the one on the effects of medicines will not always apply to the other.
  • Yet the structure of the veins, muscles, heart, lungs, stomach, liver and other parts, are nearly the same in all animals.
    • The same hypothesis which explains muscular motion, blood circulation, and digestion in one species must be applicable to every species.
    • As it agrees or disagrees with the experiments we make in any species, we may draw a proof of its truth or falsehood on the whole.
• Let us:
  • apply this method of inquiry to the mind’s anatomy
  • see what discoveries we can make by it.
    • This inquiry is just and useful in reasonings on the body.

• To do this, we must:
  • first show the correspondence of passions in men and animals
  • afterwards compare the causes which produce these passions.

• Almost in every species of creatures, especially of the nobler kind, there are many evident marks of pride and humility.
  • The very port and gait of a swan, turkey, or peacock show:
    • his high idea of himself
    • his contempt of all others.
  • In turkeys and peacocks, it is more remarkable that the pride:
    • always attends the beauty
    • is discovered only in the male.
• The following characteristics have been commonly remarked:
  • the vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing
  • the swiftness of horses
  • the sagacity and smell of hounds
  • the strength of the bull and cock
  • the particular excellency of every other animal.
• Every species of creatures which approach so often to man, as to familiarize themselves with him:
  • show an evident pride in his approbation
  • are pleased with his praises and caresses, independent of every other consideration.
• They do not get this vanity from the caresses of everyone without distinction.
  • They get it principally from the persons they know and love, in the same way as vanity is excited in mankind.
• All these are evident proofs that pride and humility are not merely human passions, but extend over the whole animal creation.

• The causes of these passions are likewise much the same in beasts as in us, making a just allowance for our superior knowledge and understanding.
• Thus, animals:
  • have little or no sense of virtue or vice
  • quickly lose sight of blood relations
  • are incapable of that of right and property.
• For which reason the causes of their pride and humility:
  • must lie solely in the body
  • can never be placed in the mind or external objects.
• With regards the body, the same qualities cause pride in animals as in humans.
  • Pride is always founded on beauty, strength, swiftness or some other useful or agreeable quality.

• Throughout creation, pride and humility:
  • are the same
  • arise from the same causes
• Do their causes also operate in the same manner?
  • According to all rules of analogy, this is justly to be expected.

• If we find on trial, that our explanation of these phenomena in one species will not apply to other species, we may presume that that explanation has no foundation.

• To answer this question, let us consider that there is the same relation of ideas from the same causes, in the minds of animals and men.
• A dog that has hidden a bone, often forgets the place.
  • But when brought to it, his thought passes easily to what he formerly concealed through the contiguity which produces a relation among his ideas.
  • Similarly, when he has been beaten in any place, he will tremble on his approach to it, even though he discovers no signs of any present danger.
• The effects of resemblance are not so remarkable.
  • But that relation makes a considerable ingredient in causation which all animals show an obvious judgment.
  • We may conclude that the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation operate in the same way on beasts as on humans.

• There are also instances of the relation of impressions which are sufficient to convince us that:
  • there is a union of certain affections with each other in the inferior and superior species of creatures
  • their minds are frequently conveyed through a series of connected emotions.
• A dog elevated with joy, runs naturally into love and kindness whether of his master or of the sex.
  • When full of pain and sorrow, he becomes quarrelsome and ill-natured.
  • His initial grief is converted into anger by the smallest occasion.

• Thus, all the internal principles necessary in us to produce pride or humility, are common to all creatures.
  • Since the causes which excite these passions are likewise the same, we may conclude that these causes operate in the same way through the whole animal creation.
• My hypothesis is so simple.
  • It supposes so little reflection and judgment.
  • It is applicable to every sensible creature.
    • This:
      • is a convincing proof of its veracity
      • will be an objection to every other system.

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