SECTION 2. THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME

Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects;

  • We may generally observe this to be the foundation of all human knowledge.
  • But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension;
  • and through whatever divisions and subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arrived at, they can never become inferior to some ideas, which we form.
  • The plain consequence is, that whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory, without any farther excuse or evasion.

Everything capable of being infinitely divided contains an infinite number of parts.

  • Otherwise the division would be stopped short by the indivisible parts, which we should immediately arrive at.
  • If therefore any finite extension be infinitely divisible, it can be no contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts:
  • And vice versa, if it be a contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible.
    • I easily convince myself that this latter supposition is absurd  by the consideration of my clear ideas.
      • I first take the least idea I can form of a part of extension.
      • Being certain that there is nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude that whatever I discover by its means must be a real quality of extension.
      • I then repeat this idea over and over and find the compound idea of extension, arising from its repetition, always to augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, etc., until at last it swells up to a considerable bulk as I repeat the same idea.
      • When I stop adding the parts, the idea of extension ceases to augment
      • If I did the addition infinitely, I clearly perceive that the idea of extension must also become infinite.
      • Upon the whole, I conclude that the idea of all infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension
        • that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts; and consequently that no finite extension is infinitely divisible [FN 3.].
  • [FN 3. It has been objected to me, that infinite divisibility supposes only:
    • an infinite number of PROPORTIONAL not of DIVIDED parts
    • an infinite number of proportional parts does not form an infinite
      extension.
  • But this distinction is entirely frivolous.
    • Whether these parts be called DIVIDED or PROPORTIONAL, they
      cannot be inferior to those minute parts we conceive;
    • Therefore they cannot form a less extension by their conjunction.]
  • I may subjoin another argument proposed by Nicolas de Malézieu which seems to me very strong and beautiful.
    • It is evident, that existence in itself belongs only to unity.
    • It is never applicable to number, but on account of the unites, of which the number is composed.
    • 20 men may be said to exist; but it is only because one, two, three, four, etc. are existent.
    • If you deny the existence of the latter, that of the former falls of course.
    • It is therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to exist, and yet deny the existence of unites.
    • Extension is always a number, according to the common sentiment of metaphysicians.
      • It never resolves itself into any unite or indivisible quantity
      • It follows that extension can never at all exist.
      • It is in vain to reply, that:
        • any determinate quantity of extension is an unite;
        • but such-a-one as admits of an infinite number of fractions, and is inexhaustible in its sub-divisions.
      • For by the same rule these 20 men may be considered as a unit.
        • The whole universe may be considered as a unit.
      • That term of unity is merely a fictitious denomination, which the mind applies to any quantity of objects it collects together
      • nor can such an unity any more exist alone than number can, as being in reality a true number.
      • But the unity, which can exist alone, and whose existence is necessary to that of all number, is of another kind, and must be perfectly indivisible, and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity.
      • All this reasoning takes place with regard to time;
      • along with an additional argument, which it may be proper to take notice of.
      • It is a property inseparable from time
      • , and which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another
      • and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-existent.
      • For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738 every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another.
      • It is certain then, that time, as it exists, must be composed of indivisible moments.
      • For if in time we could never arrive at an end of division, and if each moment, as it succeeds another, were not perfectly single and indivisible, there would be an infinite number of co-existent moments, or parts of time; which I believe will be allowed to be an arrant contradiction.
      • The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is evident from the nature of motion.
      • If infinite divisibility of time is impossible, the infinite divisibility of space must be equally impossible.
      • I doubt not but, it will readily be allowed by the most obstinate defender of the doctrine of infinite divisibility, that:
        • these arguments are difficulties
        • it is impossible to give any answer to them which will be perfectly clear and satisfactory.
  • But here we may observe, that nothing can be more absurd, than this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration, and endeavouring by that means to elude its force and evidence.
    • It is not in demonstrations as in probabilities, that difficulties can take place, and one argument counter-ballance another, and diminish its authority.
    • A just demonstration admits of no opposite difficulty
    • An unjust demonstration is a mere sophism.
      • It consequently can never be a difficulty.
      • It is either irresistible, or has no manner of force.
      • To talk therefore of objections and replies, and balancing of arguments in such a question as this, is to confess that:
        • human reason is nothing but a play of words, or
        • the person himself, who talks so, has not a Capacity equal to such subjects.
  • Demonstrations may be difficult to be comprehended, because of abstractedness of the subject;
    • but can never have such difficulties as will weaken their authority, when once they are comprehended.
  • It is true, mathematicians are wont to say, that:
    • there are here equally strong arguments on the other side of the question
    • the doctrine of indivisible points is also liable to unanswerable objections
  • Before I examine these arguments and objections in detail, I will here take them in a body.
    • I will try by a short and decisive reason to prove at once, that it is utterly impossible they can have any just foundation.
      • It is an established maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea of possible existence.
      • In other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.
        • We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist.
          • We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.
      • Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason about it?
      • It is likewise certain that this idea, as conceived by the imagination, though divisible into parts or inferior ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite number of parts:
        • For that exceeds the comprehension of our limited capacities.
      • Here then is an idea of extension, which consists of parts or inferior ideas, that are perfectly, indivisible:
      • consequently this idea implies no contradiction:
      • consequently it is possible for extension really to exist conformable to it:
      • consequently all the arguments employed against the possibility of mathematical points are mere scholastich quibbles, and unworthy of our attention.
      • These consequences we may carry one step farther, and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical;
      • since it is certain these demonstrations cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points; which it is an evident absurdity to pretend to.
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